Explanations for differences in the performance and behavior of domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and the ability to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. In this paper, we present a unique new dataset to investigate how foreign owners use the power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage these agency problems. We find that parent banks are more likely to choose host-country CEOs when monitoring institutions (supervision and accounting rules) in the host country are strong. Moreover, the effect of monitoring institutions on CEO type is stronger when there is strict supervision in the parent country and when cultural distance between home and host countries is large. These results are in line with a set of hypothesis that are based on the assumptions that the appointment of CEOs involves a trade-off between insight into the local business environment and congruence of objectives and that, on the margin, host-country CEOs have better insight, while the objectives of parent-bank CEOs are better aligned with those of the parent. However, we find no evidence that an improvement in creditor rights or credit information, which reduce information asymmetries within subsidiaries, have an impact on CEO appointments.
Introduction
Over the last twenty years, emerging markets have experienced a significant increase in foreign ownership of banks, particularly in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (Claessens and Van Horen 2012) . Banks with foreign owners from advanced economies tend to outperform other emerging market banks in terms of profitability and efficiency (Claessens, et al. 2001 , Micco, et al. 2007 , Cull and Martínez Pería 2010 , although they may be reluctant to engage in soft-information lending (Mian 2006 , Detragiache, et al. 2008 . Explanations for the behavior of foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge (Guillén and Tschoegl 2000, Sengupta 2007 ) and to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship (Stein 2002) . However, while there is evidence on the internal capital market in multinational banks (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2010) and on agency relationships within foreign-owned subsidiaries (Beck, et al. 2012, Canales and Nanda 2012) , evidence on governance relationships between parent banks and emerging market subsidiaries is almost non-existent (Majnoni, et al. 2003 is an exception).
In this paper, we investigate how foreign owners use the power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage the parent-subsidiary relationship.
1 Subsidiary executives have extensive delegated authority. It is therefore important that they have insight into the local business environment and that they can be relied upon to act in the best interest of the parent bank (Aghion and Tirole 1997) . We draw on the international management literature to argue that, at the margin, executives from the host country where a subsidiary operates are more apt to understand the local business environment, while executives with roots in the parent bank are more likely to have objectives that are congruent with those of the parent (Kobrin 1988, Gupta and Govindarajan 1991) . The choice between a parent-bank and a host-country executive thus involves a trade-off between congruence of objectives and the quality of information held by an agent. We evaluate how banks manage this trade-off in light of the institutional environment in the host country, parent-country supervision and parent-country-host-country distance.
We hand-collect a unique new dataset on executive appointments in 74 banks in fourteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe over the years 2005 to 2010. The data comprise a total of 2,063 executive-year observations, although most of the analysis focuses on CEOs. In addition to name, age and nationality of the executives, we have information on work experience and education, including experience and education abroad. We combine these data with accounting data from Bankscope for both subsidiaries and foreign parents, data on the regulatory environment from Abiad, et al. (2010) and Barth, et al. (2008) and data on strategy and internal organization of banks from the EBRD's Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS).
We initially investigate the relationship between CEO type and the quality of institutions that facilitate monitoring by the parent (rules for bank accounting and supervision). Stronger monitoring institutions increase the likelihood that a bank has a host-country CEO. In the tradeoff between congruence and insight, monitoring by the parent bank relaxes the constraint on congruence and thus facilitates the appointment of host-country CEOs.
Building on this initial result we show that banks from home countries with strong supervision are more concerned about monitoring institutions in the host country than other banks. This is in line with the results in Ongena, et al. (2013) who argue that banks are more risk-averse abroad when supervision at home is strong. In addition, monitoring institutions have a bigger effect on CEO type when the cultural distance between home and host-countries is large. Distant parent banks derive more informational benefits from good monitoring institutions. Stein (2002) argues that informational opacity at the loan level affects agency relations not only between loan officers and their supervisors but also at higher levels in the organization.
Yet, we find no relationship between creditor rights or the quality of credit information and CEO appointments, which is surprising in light of empirical evidence that foreign-owned banks struggle with soft information (e.g. Mian 2006 , Detragiache, et al. 2008 ). There are several explanations for the fact that credit information does not affect CEO appointments. For example, banks may simply avoid opaque clients when credit information is poor (Haselmann, et al. 2010 , Beck, et al. 2012 ). However, we don't find that credit institutions matter more for CEO appointments in banks that pursue strategies that rely on the use of soft information.
The empirical analysis is informed by agency theory and we show that it has significant explanatory power. That being said, parent-bank executives also engage in knowledge transfers to emerging market subsidiaries (Guillén and Tschoegl 2000) . While this is not the focus of our paper, we find that institutions are somewhat less important for the appointment of executives below the CEO. This suggests that other factors, such as knowledge transfer, play a larger role.
Overall though, we find that parent banks emphasize control over knowledge transfer and congruence over insight even though weaker institutions increase the value of both.
Indicators of institutional quality tend to be highly correlated. An important empirical concern is that the coefficients on monitoring institutions represent the impact of a wider set of institutions on CEO appointments. At the same time, institutions change slowly and a standard fixed effects model eliminates most and in some cases all variation. However, all our results are robust in a Mundlak (1978) -type model in which bank fixed effects are modeled as a function of the average of the time-varying variables in the model. This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, theoretical and empirical research into foreign ownership of banks is based on the assumption that there is an agency problem between foreign owner and subsidiary. We are the first to provide direct evidence on banks' efforts to manage this agency problem. Our findings also contribute to the broader literature on international human resource management (e.g. Harzing 2001) . While this literature has considered institutional distance, it has not directly studied the relation between the quality of host-country institutions and executive appointments. Second, building on Stein (2002) , the literature has essentially thought of agency relations in multinational banks in terms of a tradeoff between information and control, while keeping the objectives and capabilities of agents constant. We complement this by thinking of the agency problem as a trade-off between information and congruency. This is of practical relevance because multinational banks delegate, formally or effectively, many important decisions to their subsidiaries. Third, our paper suggests that there is a need for further research on the origins and consequences of information asymmetries within multilateral banks. We find that the impact of monitoring institutions, which affect opacity at the subsidiary level, on CEO appointments is different from the impact of credit information, which affect opacity at the loan level. Stein (2002) and Aghion and Tirole (1997) assume that all information asymmetries arise at the transaction level. The same is true in models that would treat subsidiary CEOs as intermediaries between parent bank and loan officer.
In what follows, we discuss the background and empirical predictions in section 2. In section 3 we present the data and empirical methodology and we discuss our results in section 4.
Finally, we discuss our findings, implications and suggestions for future research in section 5.
Background and Empirical Predictions

Agency relations in multinational banks
Research on principal-agent problems in multinational banks has generally built on the model in Stein (2002) , who studies the choice between centralization and delegation in hierarchies. In the model, principals can delegate the allocation of capital to agents who have soft information about the profitability of investment opportunities, but also seek to maximize their capital allocation.
The model suggests that centralization is often optimal in large, multi-unit organizations, especially when soft information can be hardened to some extent.
While multinational banks centralize decisions such as the allocation of capital (De Haas and Naaborg 2006), they routinely delegate important decisions to their subsidiaries, including loan approvals and local hiring. "Who to delegate to?" is therefore an important question.
The identity of the agent is not a variable of interest in Stein (2002) , but Aghion and Tirole (1997) argue that a principal is more comfortable with delegation if (i) an agent is more skilled at collecting information about business opportunities and if (ii) the objectives of the agent are congruent with those of the principal. Given the level of delegation parent banks should thus appoint CEOs who have insight into the local business environment and who are loyal to the parent. If there is heterogeneity among candidates, CEO appointments likely involve a tradeoff between insight and congruence.
Agency relations and the origin of executives
The international management literature has studied the mechanisms used by parent companies to control their foreign subsidiaries (Egelhoff 1984) . The objective of control is to ensure that subsidiaries act in the interests of the multinational company as a whole, but this is often complicated by the need to be responsive to local circumstances (Prahalad and Doz 1987, Nohria and Ghoshal 1994) . In addition to using formal control mechanisms (e.g. the allocation of resources), multinationals employ socialization to exercise informal control, for example through executive appointments at subsidiaries (Edstrom and Galbraith 1977) . Within the context of the agency relationship between parent and subsidiary, socialization is akin to the promotion of shared values or congruence in objectives (Ouchi 1980, Nohria and Ghoshal 1994) .
Research on human resource management in multinational companies has thought of parent-country nationals as inherently more attuned to the objectives and business practices of a company's headquarters, while host-country nationals have more insight into the local market environment, for example because they speak the local language (Edstrom and Galbraith 1977 , Kobrin 1988 , Gupta and Govindarajan 1991 . An important function of parent-country executives is therefore to exercise control on behalf of the parent. Empirical evidence suggests that multinationals are more likely to appoint parent-country executives in CEO or CFO positions where they exercise control rather than in executive positions that are focused on local marketing or human resource management (Harzing 2001 , Brenner 2009 ). There is limited research on the extent to which the quality of host-country institutions affects the choice between host-country and parent-country executives. However, several papers find that high cultural or institutional distance is associated with the appointment of parent-country nationals (Harzing 2001 , Gong 2003 , Gaur, et al. 2007 ). Hence, even though multinationals could benefit from the insight of host-country nationals in distant locations, they tend to emphasize control over insight.
The subsidiary CEO as intermediary
In addition to being an agent of the parent bank, a subsidiary CEO can also be seen as an intermediary between the parent and loan officers in the subsidiary. 2 In the models of Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002) , agents are motivated to collect information on a project by private benefits they derive from potential investments in the project. The prospect that the principal may overrule the agent works as a disincentive to gather information (see also Stein 2002) . If an intermediary has objectives somewhere between those of the CEO and the agent, he or she can act as a buffer between the principal and the agent, which increases agents' incentives to do research. This can make the principal better off if the value of information collected by agents is high relative to the cost of handing control to the intermediary.
Agency relations and host-country institutions
Institutions in the host country create or attenuate informational asymmetries between subsidiaries and their foreign parents. Empirical evidence shows that these asymmetries affect entry by multinational banks as well as lending behavior conditional on entry (Buch and DeLong 2004 , Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005 , Haselmann, et al. 2010 , Houston, et al. 2012 . Generally speaking, the literature has found that stronger institutions that reduce information asymmetries facilitate foreign investment in banking as well as risk-taking conditional upon entry. However, research has generally overlooked an important distinction between, say, accounting rules for banks and, say, the availability of credit information. Accounting rules affect the ability of parent banks to monitor subsidiary CEOs and therefore directly affect the parent-CEO agency relationship. Stricter accounting rules, or more generally better "monitoring institutions", reduce the need for parent-CEO congruence and thus facilitate the appointment of host-country CEOs.
By contrast, the availability of hard credit information initially affects the principal-agent relationship between the subsidiary CEO and his or her loan officers. How it affects the parent-CEO relationship depends on the way in which the bank responds to changes in the availability of information. In countries where the availability of hard credit information is limited, soft information collected by loan officers is relatively important for decision making. From a CEOas-intermediary point of view, it then becomes attractive to appoint a CEO whose objectives are relatively close to those of the loan officers in order to motivate the loan officers to collect information. From the perspective of the parent, the cost of such an appointment is a loss in congruence between CEO and parent. Empirical evidence suggests that this cost may be too high: foreign-owned banks tend to restrict soft-information lending when credit information or creditor rights are poor (Haselmann, et al. 2010 , Beck, et al. 2012 .
Home country characteristics and distance
Recent work by Houston, et al. (2012) and Ongena, et al. (2013) shows that home-country regulation has an impact on the scope of bank activities abroad. Strict regulation of activities at home is associated with more risk-taking abroad. This relationship is particularly strong when banking supervision at home is weak (Ongena, et al. 2013) . In the present context, this suggests that banks respond to a stricter regulatory environment at home by choosing strategies that increase the need for insight into the local environment -and thus for host-country CEOs.
However, stringent home-country supervision makes parents more sensitive to the quality of oversight over their foreign subsidiaries, which favors parent-bank CEOs.
Home-country characteristics also matter because they create geographical, cultural or regulatory distance. Distance causes information asymmetries and it may reduce (perceived) congruence between the parent bank and host-country nationals. Several studies show that distance makes banks more risk averse in their cross-country lending and investment (Buch and DeLong 2004 , Mian 2006 , Giannetti and Yafeh 2012 , De Haas and Van Horen 2013 . This is consistent with evidence that multinationals appoint parent-country executives when distance grows, asserting control but giving up on insight into the local environment (Harzing 2001) .
Hypotheses
Building on the preceding discussion, we test three hypotheses. First, we expect that institutions that facilitate monitoring of the subsidiary will be associated with the appointment of hostcountry CEOs. Second, the effect of both distance and poor credit information on CEO appointments is indeterminate. In both cases, there are benefits to appointing a host-country CEO who is closer to local loan officers or has more insight into the local business environment, but the cost of handing control to a CEO with non-congruent objectives may be too high for the parent. Hence, we can think of the need for congruence as a constraint on the parent's ability to appoint a host-country CEO. Monitoring institutions relax this constraint and we expect the marginal effect of better monitoring institutions on CEO-type to be large when parent-subsidiary distance is high or credit information in the host country is poor. Third, we expect that the quality of banking supervision in the home country will lead parent banks to emphasize control, especially when monitoring institutions in the host country are weak.
Data and Methodology
This paper presents a unique new dataset of executive appointments in 74 foreign-owned banks in thirteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe (the CEE region) over the years 2005 to 2010. Most of the countries in the region have implemented far-reaching reforms since the beginning of economic transition in the early 1990s. However, cross-country variation in the quality of institutions remains significant (Cottarelli, et al. 2005) . Foreign banks, mostly from
Western Europe along with some from the United States, control more than 65 percent of the banking sector in the region. Recently, OTP, a Hungarian bank, and a few Russian banks have also made acquisitions in the CEE countries. The subsidiaries in our dataset tend to offer a wide range of commercial banking services to predominantly local clients. Below the level of the executive board, staff in the subsidiaries is overwhelmingly from the host country.
Executives
Our data cover 355 bank years with a total of 2,063 executive-year entries from 695 unique executives. In addition to the names, gender, and nationalities of executives, we have information on their age, tenure at their current bank, prior experience, and education, including foreign experience and education. Data on executives comes primarily from bank websites and annual reports but we also checked executive profiles in Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database and reputable websites like Bloomberg (but not in self-reported information such as LinkedIn).
In a limited number of cases (23 executives, 4 CEOs), we could not determine an executive's nationality. Because nationality is such an important variable in our analysis we used the address book on Skype to determine a "most likely" nationality for these executives. We entered an executive's last name into the Skype address book and checked which country was most frequently associated with this name. 3 We validated this approach by using the "Skype method" on executives with a confirmed nationality. This revealed that Skype does not allow us to differentiate very well between, say, Belgium and France, but it does enable us to differentiate between Belgium and Romania, which is the important distinction.
We divide executives into two groups based on their nationalities. "Host-country executives" are nationals of the country in which a subsidiary is located. We count Slovak nationals as host-country executives in the Czech Republic (and vice versa) and we count executives from any of the parts of former Yugoslavia as host-country executives in the other parts. Some of these executives started their careers in what were then Czechoslovak or Yugoslav banks and even if they didn't, they grew up and were educated in Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia and they are likely to share a common understanding of business practices.
Executives from the parent country of a bank or from third countries are all "parent-bank executives". The international management literature has sometimes treated third-country nationals as a separate category on the basis of the argument that they stand in between host-and parent-country nationals (for example because they are from the region of the subsidiary Collings, et al. 2008) . However, the third-country executives in our dataset do not fit this description. They are often from Western Europe and frequently they have built a career in the parent bank including at headquarters. Hence, their career prospects depend on their success in serving the interests of the parent just like it does for parent-country executives. We summarize executive characteristics in Table 2 . Individuals in our database are generally male and in their mid-forties, with parent-bank executives slightly older and more likely to be male than their host-country counterparts. Host-country nationals are more likely to have at least a master's degree than parent-bank executives, but less likely to have foreign work experience or a foreign education. 5 Finally, parent-bank executives have a shorter tenure at the subsidiary and in the board than host-country nationals but a longer tenure at the parent bank.
Institutions, distance and other data
We combine the hand-collected data on executives with bank level and parent-bank level accounting data from Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope database. Information on country-level institutions comes from a variety of sources. We have two measures for monitoring institutions.
First, we use the score, as of 2005, for the quality of banking supervision from Abiad, et al. (2010) . The score rates countries on a scale of 0 to 3; a higher score indicates that regulators apply stricter rules and have the legal authority and capacity to exercise effective supervision.
Second, we use the score for bank accounting rules from Barth, et al. (2013) . 6 The score measures, on a scale from 0 to 4, to what extent banks can recognize interest on nonperforming loans as income and whether they have to produce consolidated statement. A higher score is associated with more stringent accounting practices.
As a proxy for the importance of soft information in lending decisions, we use the score for the quality of credit information from the Doing Business Database, which measures the scope and accessibility of credit information on a scale from 0 to 6. 7 As an alternative measure, we also use the Doing Business score for creditor rights, which measures the quality of collateral laws and legal protection for secured creditors in case of bankruptcy.
Our measure for geographical distance between countries comes from the French center for research on the international economy, CEPII. 8 Cultural distance is calculated on the basis of the four dimensions of national culture that were conceived by Hofstede (Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance). 9 On all dimensions, countries receive a score from 0 to 100 and cultural distance is calculated as the Euclidian distance between parent and host-countries on the basis of these scores (i.e. we calculate how different countries are, but do not interpret the direction of differences).
In some of the additional analysis of our results, we use information from the Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS), which was held by the EBRD in 2004. To measure banks'
focus on retail clients, we use the percentage of loans going to households. We also use information from the BEPS to measure the hierarchical nature of the internal organization of subsidiaries. Banks were asked about the maximum size of a loan that could be approved by a branch manager. We create a dummy that is 1 if the loan approval authority of branch managers is smaller than the median for the host country in which the subsidiary is located. Hence, the dummy is 1 for subsidiaries that have a relatively hierarchical organization that promotes the use of hard information (Stein 2002, Liberti and Mian 2009 ).
7 www.doingbusiness.org 8 www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6 9 www.geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix; a fifth dimension (long-term orientation) and a sixth (Indulgence vs. restraint) have been added to the set of cultural dimensions, but the country coverage does not fully coincide between the first four and the additional dimensions.
Empirical model
The hypotheses predict a link between the likelihood that a parent-bank executive is appointed and host-country and home-country institutions. The baseline model has the following specification (with subscripts i for bank, j for parent bank, c for country and t for time):
(1)
In equation (1) The main challenge in estimating equation (1) is that there may be unobserved bank and country characteristics that affect CEO appointments even after we control for relevant observables. We are particularly concerned that characteristics of the business climate in host countries are correlated with the institutions of interest. In principle, bank or country fixed effects would control for this but fixed effects wipe out (almost) all variation in the institutional variables. In some cases, institutional variables are time-invariant but even when there is variation over time this is limited. For example, the score for creditor rights does not change in eight out of thirteen countries over the course of the sample period. In three of the other countries, it changes once, by one point. Even if fixed effects estimates were statistically significant one could wonder if estimates that are identified by observations from a handful of countries are meaningful.
Instead of estimating a standard fixed effects model, we follow Mundlak (1978) and explicitly model unobserved heterogeneity across banks. If we simplify equation (1) 
In equation (2), ε ijct is decomposed into c i , a bank-level fixed effect and η ijct , a mean-zero error that is assumed to be uncorrelated with X and Z. Mundlak models c i as a function of the banklevel averages of X, and we estimate:
As shown by Mundlak (1978) , this estimator produces the fixed effects estimate for β (see also 
Control variables
At the bank level, we control for size (log of assets), capitalization (the equity-to-assets ratio) and profitability (ROA). Both size and capitalization of a subsidiary indicate how much is at stake for the parent bank. A lack of profitability might induce owners to appoint a parent-bank CEO in an effort to realign strategy and restore profits (Harzing 2001) . We include a dummy for banks established through greenfield investment and the log of the number of years a bank has 10 www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx
been under foreign ownership. At greenfield banks, owners start with a clean slate and can appoint executives to their liking, but at acquired banks they may be reluctant to replace incumbents, at least initially. Alternatively, it may become easier to delegate to host-country nationals over time as they become more attuned to the objectives and practices of the parent bank. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a subsidiary is listed in its host country. When the parent has to take the concerns of other owners into account, appointing a parent-country executive may be more difficult.
Because cultural attributes of the home country or the parent bank could have an impact on executive appointments, we control for the tendency of parents to appoint parent-bank CEOs.
For parents with multiple subsidiaries in the dataset we calculate, for each subsidiary and each year, the unconditional probability that the other banks in the parent network have a parent-bank CEO (we set the variable to zero for subsidiaries that have no siblings in a given year). At the level of parent banks, we further control for size, capitalization and profitability. Large and wellcapitalized parents might be willing to take some risk and leave subsidiaries in the hands of local executives. Alternatively, large banks may have well-established policies that promote expatriate appointments as a part of management development (Harzing 2001) . Well-run and profitable parent banks may seek to "export" surplus managerial resources to subsidiaries (Tschoegl 2005) .
In addition to the log of GDP per capita and the ICRG score for economic risk, we include GDP growth to control for demand conditions and the ratio of bank credit to GDP to control for the development of the banking sector in the host country. Furthermore, we include enrolment in tertiary education as a proxy for the availability of highly qualified individuals in the host country.
Summary statistics of the control variables and all other variables are reported in Table 3 .
Results
The first set of regressions is reported in Table 4 . By way of reference for the fixed effects model, the first column presents OLS estimates. There is a strong negative correlation between the quality of supervision in the host-country and the likelihood that a bank has a parent-bank CEO. This is consistent with the notion that supervision facilitates monitoring by parents.
Coefficients on the control variables suggest that large subsidiaries are less likely, while listed banks are more likely to have parent-bank CEOs. Large and well-capitalized parent banks are more likely to choose parent-bank CEOs.
We move to the fixed effects estimates in column 2 and also cluster the standard errors by bank. This produces a larger standard error on supervision, but it is almost significant at the 1 percent level. 11 Adding the ICRG score for economic risk to the model in column 3 does not change much. In columns 2 and 3 we cluster standard errors at the subsidiary level, but one might argue that we should really cluster the errors at the level of parent banks. Doing so in column 4, we see a slight increase in standard errors on some variables and a decline in others, but there is no large change in the significance of supervision.
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the estimates in columns 3 and 4 with bank accounting rules.
This gives us access to a slightly larger sample (supervision is missing for Croatia, Slovakia and Macedonia; accounting rules are missing for Kazakhstan). The results confirm that banks are more likely to have a parent-bank CEO if monitoring institutions are weak. The size of the coefficients is meaningful. A one-standard-deviation increase in the score for supervision reduces the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-bank CEO by about 30 percent of a standard deviation. In the case of accounting rules, a one-standard deviation increase leads to a reduction in the likelihood of a parent-bank CEO by a little less than 15 percent of a standard deviation.
In the Mundlak fixed effects estimates most control variables lose significance as their bank-level averages are included in the model. However, the coefficient on log assets remains significant if errors are clustered by bank. Moreover, in columns 5 and 6, the economic risk score enters with a negative coefficient, indicating that lower economic risk makes it less likely that foreign owners choose parent-bank CEOs.
The results in Table 4 are robust in a variety of alternative specifications. For example, they hold up in a probit model (with Mundlak-type fixed effects) and, with the exception of column 4, the results also hold when we restrict the sample to observations for which we have both the supervision score and the score for accounting rules. Although the results do not hold if we use the scores for supervisory powers from Barth, et al. (2013) 12 , the results are robust to using a dummy that is equal to 1 if both accounting rules and supervision are above the median in the sample. The results also hold when we replace dependent variable with a dummy that is equal to 1 only when the CEO is from the parent country (i.e. excluding third-country nationals)
or with a variable that allows for "hybrid nationalities" to operationalize the idea that hostcountry nationals can be "socialized" into the multinational environment. Specifically, the variable is equal to 3 for parent-bank executives, equal to 2 for host-country executives with foreign work experience and equal to 1 for host-country executives with a foreign education.
Overall, the results confirm that subsidiaries are more likely to have parent-bank CEOs when institutional weaknesses reduce parents' ability to monitor. 12 The score for supervisory power from Barth et al. puts a lot of weight on enforcement powers and Barth, et al. (2008) find the score to be associated with corruption in lending.
Credit information and creditor rights
The direct effect of credit information on CEO appointments is indeterminate, but we anticipate that the marginal effect of monitoring institutions is stronger in countries with weak creditor rights. We investigate this in Table 5 . In this table and going forward, we have restricted the data to observations for which we have the supervision and bank accounting scores. In the first column, we enter credit information along with supervision and find that supervision remains significant while credit information is insignificant. In column 2, we assess whether the quality of credit information affects the marginal impact of monitoring institutions on CEO type. We divide the data into four quadrants based on whether credit information and supervision are above or below the median. Each quadrant is identified with a dummy. We enter three dummies while omitting the weak monitoring / weak credit information dummy. 13 When credit information is weak, the impact of an improvement in supervision on CEO type remains negative and significant (coefficient (1)). When credit information is strong, the marginal effect of supervision on CEO type is somewhat smaller (Difference: (3) -(2) at the bottom of the table) and insignificant. However, the marginal effects of supervision are not significantly different with strong or with weak credit information (Test: (3) - (2) = (1)).
We repeat the analysis with creditor rights in columns 3 and 4 with accounting rules in columns 5 to 8 of The direct effect of credit institutions on CEO appointments is never significant. This is perhaps not surprising because the effect is theoretically indeterminate, especially if we take into account that banks may change their strategy in response to weak credit institutions. However, it is worth some further investigation given the emphasis in the literature on the notion that foreign-owned banks struggle with soft information. In Table 6 we investigate whether credit institutions matter more for banks that focus on retail clients, i.e. soft information clients. In columns 1 to 4, we use the percentage of loans that went to households in 2004 as a proxy for retail focus. The results show a positive relationship between retail focus and the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-bank CEO. However, in unreported regressions, we find no such effect and generally, the coefficient on the share of loans going to households is very sensitive to the specification. In columns 5 to 8, we use the ratio of customer deposits to loans to measure retail focus. This ratio tends to be higher for banks that have access to retail deposits (Altunbas, et al. 2011 ). We find that subsidiaries with a large share of deposit funding are less likely to have a parent-bank CEO. This is more in line with expectations: a focus on retail clients raises the importance of local knowledge. Again, however, there is no clear relationship between credit institutions and CEO type.
In addition to client focus, the internal organization of a bank affects the importance of soft information in decision making. We use data from the BEPS survey to construct a dummy that is equal to 1 if branch managers have limited discretion over loan approvals, which favors the use of hard information over soft information (Stein 2002, Liberti and Mian 2009 ). When we enter the dummy into our equation in Table 7 , it has a strongly positive coefficient. The appointment of parent-bank CEOs, who have less insight into the local business environment, is thus associated with hierarchical decision making rules. Whether the impact of creditor institutions on CEO type depends on the internal organization is unclear. In column 2, the marginal effect of better credit information is positive when loan approval limits are low (coefficient (3) -coefficient (1)), but not when approval limits are high. For creditor rights in column 4, the situation is reversed. In all other cases, creditor institutions are insignificant.
Hence, while the results in Table 7 are interesting in their own right, they do not clarify the relationship between creditor institutions and CEO type.
Home country characteristics and distance
Bank supervision at home does not have a direct impact on information asymmetries between banks and their subsidiaries, but they may well affect parent banks' concern about such asymmetries. Table 8 reports a set of regressions that investigate the relationship between monitoring institutions at home and the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-bank CEO. The estimates reveal that supervision at home has a positive linear effect on CEO type. Moreover, when supervision at home is weak, the impact of host-country monitoring institutions on CEO type is insignificant (coefficient (1) in columns 2 and 6). By contrast, when supervision at home is strong, monitoring institutions in the host country have a strong significant impact on CEO type (coefficient (3) -(2)), which is significantly different from the effect when parent-country supervision is weak (test: (3) -(2) = (1)). When home-country supervisors keep a close eye on parents, the parents are much more likely to keep a close eye on their subsidiaries when hostcountry monitoring institutions are weak. This is consistent with the result in Ongena, et al.
(2013) that tight home-country supervision makes foreign-owned banks more risk averse. They also find, as we do here, that the enforcement of rules at home (supervision) has a more important effect on bank behavior than the restrictiveness of the rules themselves (accounting rules in our case).
Supervision in home countries matters because it determines how concerned parents are about institutional weaknesses in host countries. In Table 9 , we investigate the role of distancedifferences between countries that are due to distance don't necessarily reflect strengths or weaknesses but they reduce the level of familiarity between home and host country. The results suggest that cultural, but not physical, distance matters for CEO appointments. Cultural distance itself has a (weakly) positive impact on the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-bank CEO.
This is consistent with e.g. (Harzing 2001) . However, the effect of cultural distance is small and insignificant when monitoring institutions are strong (coefficient (3) - (1) in columns 4 and 8).
When cultural distance increases the value of a CEO's insight into the local business environment grows. CEOs. As we anticipated, monitoring institutions provide informational benefits to parent-banks that have to manage large cultural differences in particular, which facilitates delegation to host-country nationals
Other executives
We have cast CEOs as agents or intermediaries who manage subsidiaries on behalf of the parent bank and discussed the choice between CEO types as a trade-off between insight and congruence. The evidence so far has been consistent with the existence of such a trade-off.
However, in addition to providing oversight, parent-bank executives also play a role in knowledge transfer (Kobrin 1988 , Tschoegl 2005 . We would expect this to be especially relevant at levels below the CEO where executives are responsible for e.g. the implementation of modern risk management, IT, HR policies and sales.
The regressions in Table 10 aim to get a better insight into the extent to which the appointment of other executives is driven by different considerations than the appointment of CEOs. To begin with panel A, we run Poisson regressions with the number of parent-bank executives (excluding the CEO) as dependent variable. The regressions show that strong accounting rules tend to reduce the number of parent-bank executives, but the coefficient on supervision is insignificant. Hence, after we control for CEO type, which is strongly correlated with supervision, supervision has no further impact on the origin of other executives.
Unsurprisingly, the number of executives is positively related to the number of parentbank executives but after we control for the parent-bank CEO dummy and the number of executives, the percentage of parent-bank executives in a bank's network is insignificant.
In Panel B of Table 10 we look at the likelihood that a newly appointed executive has roots in the parent bank given the share of parent-bank executives among incumbents. The results show that there is a negative relationship between the share of parent-bank incumbents and the likelihood that a new appointee is from the parent bank. Considering that the regression includes the bank-level average of the share of parent-bank incumbent, the coefficient implies that, when there are more (or fewer) parent-bank executives than some equilibrium level, banks choose a new appointee to restore equilibrium. The impact of better monitoring institutions on new appointments is negative insignificant.
Taken together, the results in Table 10 show that, after we control for CEO type or the origin of incumbent executives, monitoring institutions have some impact on the type of executives below the CEO, but this impact is weaker than that of institutions on CEO type. At the margin, parent banks, or subsidiary CEOs are concerned about maintaining the balance between parent-bank and host-country executives. They rarely appoint boards that have only host-country executives (15 percent of bank-year observations) or only parent-bank executives (2 percent). Moreover, whenever the share of parent-bank executives among incumbents deviates from its average, new appointments are used to restore the balance.
Conclusion
We investigate the agency relationship between parent banks and their subsidiaries and evaluate how the institutional environment affects the choice between host-country and parent-bank executives. We find that parent banks are more likely to choose host-country CEOs when monitoring institutions in the host country are strong. Moreover, the effect of monitoring institutions on CEO type is stronger when supervision in the parent country is stringent and when cultural distance between home and host-country is large. The results are in line with a set of hypothesis that are based on the assumptions that the appointment of CEOs involves a trade-off between insight into the local business environment and congruence of objectives and that, on the margin, host-country CEOs have better insight, while the objectives of parent-bank CEOs are better aligned with those of the parent.
The results and the theoretical framework underlying the hypotheses suggest three areas for further research -some of which we are currently working on. First and most immediately, the identification of the relationship between CEO appointments and the institutional environment is complicated by the fact that both institutions and CEOs change slowly and one needs longer panels to be able to see whether and how banks respond to institutional change.
Second, in developing our hypotheses, we leaned on empirical findings with regard the relationship between institutions and bank strategies to explain how institutions are likely to affect the trade-off between insight and congruence. Ideally however, we would integrate the analysis of executive appointments and banks' strategic choices.
Third, one of our "findings" stands out for its absence. The banking literature has investigated extensively whether foreign-owned banks are well-placed to engaged in softinformation and many authors have found that they are not (Berger, et al. 2005 , Mian 2006 , Detragiache, et al. 2008 , Gormley 2010 . The theoretical argument underpinning these results is that the information asymmetries between the parent bank and, ultimately, loan officers in large hierarchies in the subsidiary prevent foreign-owned banks from engaging in soft information lending (Stein 2002) . However, while we find that monitoring institutions that affect the hardness of information at the portfolio level have an impact on CEO type, we find no such impact of credit institutions that affect the hardness of information at the loan level. This is true even for banks that engage in soft-information lending. This suggests that agency problems between parent and foreign subsidiaries do not depend on the hardness of loan-level information but only on the hardness of subsidiary-or portfolio-level information such as data on economic prospects. Given their span of control, it is not feasible for managers at the parent bank (or indeed for subsidiary executives) to exercise effective control over loan-level decisions (Aghion and Tirole 1997) and as long as they can appoint subsidiary CEOs or branch managers as delegated monitors, they do not need to (Diamond 1984) . Taken together this points to an agenda for both theoretical and empirical research into the way in which information is aggregated within hierarchies and how this facilitates or inhibits the use of soft information in decisions about loans or projects that are part of a larger portfolio. Banking supervision is a three-point indicator of the strength of the regulatory framework and legal authority of the regulator in the host country. Bank accounting is a four-point measure of disclosure in accounts. Creditor rights measures the quality of collateral laws and legal protection for secured creditors in case of bankruptcy on a ten-point scale and Contract-viability measures the sanctity of contracts on a six-point one. Cultural distance is the Euclidean distance between parent and host country on Hofstede's 4 item scale of cultural dimensions. Parent-bank CEO is a dummy that is 1 if a CEO has roots in the parent bank. CEO hybrid nationality is a categorical variable that is equal to 3 if an executive has roots in the parent bank, 2 for host-country executives with foreign work experience, 1 for host-country with a foreign education and 0 otherwise. % Parent-bank CEOs (executives) in parent network is the unconditional probability that a CEO (executive) in another subsidiary with the same owner as the observed bank is a parent-bank CEO (executive). The variable is set to zero for banks without siblings in the data set. log of Years under foreign ownership is the log of the number of years since foreign acquisition or foreign greenfield investment by the owner (or previous foreign owner) of a bank. Foreign greenfield is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a bank was established through a greenfield investment by a foreign owner. Branch manager loan approval limit low is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the branch managers of a subsidiary have a loan approval limit that is below the median for their country. Table 3 for a definition of all other variables. OLS refers to ordinary least squares regression. FE refers to Mundlak (1978) fixed effects regression. According to this approach bank-level fixed effects are modeled as a function of the average values of the time-varying independent variables in the model and these averages are included in the regression model (the coefficients are not reported). Monitoring institutions (banking supervision, accounting rules), the bank is listed dummy and the economic risk rating are treated as time invariant; their average values were not included. All models include year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if a newly appointed executive is from the parent bank. All estimates are from a Mundlak (1978) fixed effects regression (see Table 4 ). Monitoring institutions, th ebank is listed dummy as well as the economic risk rating are treated as time invariant. In panel A, the estimation method is Poisson regression. In Panel B the method is linear regression. All models include the control variables listed in Table 4 as well as year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
